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Abstract
The introduction of a potentially disruptive technology into a mature multisided
ecosystem often faces a seemingly dilemmatic challenge: persuading a critical mass of
incumbents to support the technology that might eventually disrupt them. We analyse
this apparently perplexing phenomenon under the lens of a global coordination game of
incomplete public and private information; and more precisely an adaptation of a game
of regime change. Incumbents can decide to support or not the potential disruptor, who
becomes successful only if a sufficient mass of supporters is attained. The proposed
model assumes a multi-round game where each round gives the opportunity for yet-
not-supporting incumbents to irrevocably side with the potential disruptor. Only a
two-round game is detailed, while elements for generalization to an arbitrary number
of rounds are suggested. The first round constitutes a rather typical—i.e., extensively
scrutinized in the literature—global game, for which it has already formally been estab-
lished that a monotone equilibrium exists and is unique provided an adequate precision of
the information structure. Subsequently, when making their decision during the second
round, incumbents gain additional information derived from the first round. Although we
do not formally prove the results, we conducted an extensive set of simulations revealing
that the new information leads to either no equilibrium or a multiplicity of equilibria.
Bearing in mind that our model is overly stylized, those observations suggest that the
second round is prone to coordination failure; whereas the precision of information plays
an essential role during the first round for incumbents to make an informed decision. It
follows that a wise strategy consists for the potential disruptor in investing, at the very
outset, in communicating precise information so as to ensure the existence of a unique
equilibrium and, should the underlying fundamentals allow, succeed in the first round.
Keywords: disruptive innovation, multisided platforms, global games, coordination
games, incomplete information, multiple equilibria.
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Attempting to enter a mature and multisidedbusiness ecosystem with a potentially disrup-tive technology may reveal a thorny path.
Mature business ecosystems revolving around multi-
sided platforms appear to possess solid means of
preventing any new player posing threat to existing
players from entering the sphere; so much that a
potential disruptor’s success vastly depends on the
support of the to-be-disrupted incumbents, a conun-
drum recently referred to as the disruptor’s dilemma
(Ansari et al., 2016). Although it is not difficult to
understand why the potential disruptor would want
to seek support from incumbents, it is much less
clear why incumbents would be willing to engage
in any sort of collaboration. Such an observation
suggests that disruption in such an ecosystem counts
as a triumph. Yet, disruptions not only happen, but
it is the fate of all businesses.
We present a game theoretic model of incom-
plete information towards analysing the dynamics
of decision-making by incumbents based on their
beliefs formed (at least partly) via information
divulged, either privately or publicly, by the poten-
tial disruptor. More precisely, we use a global game
model (Carlsson and van Damme, 1993; Morris and
Shin, 2001; Frankel et al., 2003), and even more
precisely a global game of regime change (Angeletos
et al., 2007). Following a similar development as
in the work of Angeletos et al. (2007), we start by
a static game which differs from the one discussed
by Angeletos et al. (2007) only in the payoff struc-
ture. We then examine a more realistic scenario
in which incumbents can make their decision to
support the potential disruptor in a second round,
where further information is gained from observing
the noisy outcome of the first one. We succinctly
discuss the generalization to an arbitrary number of
rounds.
In games of imperfect information (also known as
Bayesian games), the assumed rationality implies
that each incumbent acts in a way to maximize
its payoff. Each incumbent’s payoff depends on
its decision, on the decision of other incumbents
in the ecosystem and on some unknown economic
fundamentals (Morris and Shin, 2001); therefore,
the incumbent’s decision must repose on its beliefs
regarding economic fundamentals, and on its appre-
ciation of the other players’ beliefs as well, which
gives raise “to an infinite regress in reciprocal expec-
tation on the part of the players” (Harsanyi, 1967,
p. 5) due to endless higher order beliefs—although,
in practice, there seem to be a limit (Strzalecki,
2014). Considering the entire set of higher order
beliefs together with a high-dimensional representa-
tion of economic fundamentals may become rapidly
overwhelming, to the point of not being practicable.
Global games offer a simplified representation of
such a situation where economic fundamentals are
captured by a single parameter θ, and each player
receives a different signal of θ—the difference is due
to noise (Morris and Shin, 2001).
Although a global game model may lack sophistica-
tion, or may even appear overly stylized, to fully
capture the intricate dynamics of the disruptor’s
dilemma, “[r]emember that all models are wrong; the
practical question is how wrong do they have to be to
not be useful” (Box and Draper, 1987, p. 74). The
work introduced throughout this paper should be
regarded as a preliminary step in constructing tools
to help both the potential disruptor and the incum-
bents in making strategic decisions when confronting
the dilemma. Those tools should belong to a broader
portfolio of tools and other existing frameworks (as
a complement), and are not intended to provide defi-
nite answers.
A brief look at the literature in global games reveals
an obvious frequently recurring pattern consisting
in, first, presenting a set of assumptions, on top of
which a model is developed; then, subsequently, in
giving formal proofs of the existence of equilibria and
other properties together with conditions that guar-
antee a unique equilibrium (see, e.g., Carlsson and
van Damme, 1993; Chamley, 1999; Angeletos et al.,
2007; Frankel et al., 2003; Edmond, 2013). We do
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not follow this pattern. Instead, we rely on extensive
simulations to discover equilibria. One can argue
that simulations’ results should be loosely consid-
ered and are unsuitable for making conclusive claims
about a larger context than the one in which simula-
tions are conducted (i.e., generalizations are at best
insubstantial). On the other hand, such results are
meaningful for developing insights on the matter.
Such an insight can be valuable in practice; besides,
it can be a first exploratory step towards devising
formal proofs of the suggested/observed results.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows: In
Section 1 we extensively delve into the disruptor’s
dilemma. Our proposed model and conducted simu-
lations are presented in Section 2. Finally, in Section
3, we discuss the limitations of our model and
suggest some future directions of investigation.
1. The Disruptor’s Dilemma
The simplest description of the dilemma can triv-
ially be grasped by the observation that “[f]irms
introducing disruptive innovations into multi-
sided ecosystems confront the disruptor’s dilemma:
gaining the support of the very incumbents they
disrupt” (Ansari et al., 2016, page 1). Central to this
description of the dilemma are the terms disruptive
innovations and multisided ecosystems, which calls
for further elaboration.
1.1. Disruptive Innovations
Ansari et al. (2016, note 1) define disruptive inno-
vations as:
[N]ew technologies, products or business
models that are financially unattractive to
incumbents . . . . They can be (1) “low-
end” innovations that target customers
“overserved” by the functionality of their
current provider, such as discount depart-
ment stores (e.g., Walmart), (2) “new-
market” innovations that target “non-
served” customers, i.e., those unable to
access, use or even afford the product,
such as online auctions (e.g., eBay), or (3)
hybrids, that combine both overserved and
non-consumers, such as low-cost airlines
(e.g., Southwest Airlines).
Technology-wise, disruption is not necessarily
achieved via performance superiority, as common
sense may suggest—as well as suggested in some
preliminary works (Utterback and Abernathy,
1975)—but through a complex evolutionary mech-
anism where the trajectory of offered performance
grows much faster than the trajectory of needed
performance. Consequently, the performance of the
quasi-unnoticed and seemingly inferior technology
eventually becomes what users need (Christensen,
1997). Based on Christensen (1997)’s work, Adner
(2002, p. 2) contends that “[d]isruptive technologies
are technologies that introduce a different perfor-
mance package from mainstream technologies and
are inferior to mainstream technologies along the
dimensions of performance that are most important
to mainstream customers.”
By contrast, Kavadias et al. (2016) argue that
disruptions happen via a combination of both new
technologies and new business models, for a new
technology alone might not suffice. They identi-
fied six traits that seem to be recurrently recognized
in a number of recent successful business models
(and absent from the ones that proved unsuccessful).
They also observe that the odds of success for a
potential disruptor remain meager: “Most attempts
to introduce a new model fail—but occasionally one
succeeds in overturning the dominant model, usually
by leveraging a new technology” (Kavadias et al.,
2016, p. 3).
It is worth noting that, although disruptions appear
to be exceedingly rare, this is, paradoxically, the fate
of all successful business organizations (Christensen,
1997); we further elaborate on that point in the next
section (Section 1.2).
In spite of having received much attention by
academics and industrials, given the absence of
precise consensus, remarking the fact that many
works, such as the ones cited above, justify their
claim by finding a few examples of situations
that somehow corroborate the claim—a context
obviously prone to the confirmation bias, for the
cases that disconfirm the theory are conveniently
ignored (Nickerson, 1998)—and noting the unde-
niable alarmingly high number of failed attempts
(Marmer et al., 2011), the mechanism leading to
successful innovations (and therefore disruptions) is
still to be identified. Further, the possibility that
such a mechanism does not exist cannot be ruled
out, those radical changes might happen by sheer
luck or serendipity—a phenomenon falling under
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the umbrella of the so-called black swans (Taleb,
2008). Whether such a mechanism exists seems to
be still an open question that some scholars have
been attempting to elucidate; Christensen (1997),
one of them, expresses strong presumptions in favour
of its existence.
The disruptive consequences of some innovations
are not always intentional. There are cases where
both the instigator of a new technology and the
incumbents had not foreseen the full disruptive
power of the new technology. As a case in point,
consider the introduction of the iPhone in 2007,
“[Apple] aims to sell 10 million iPhones through the
end of 2008, which would account for about 1%
of the annual global handset market” (Yuan and
Bryan-Low, 2007, para. 5); whereas some analysts
from prominent financial institutions reported that 2
million units could be sold at best (Yuan and Bryan-
Low, 2007). A modest ambition from Apple and
an amusing prediction from analysts when we now
know the actual figures: Apple exceeded its target
for 2008 (Cheng, 2008), and went on to reach a
staggering cumulative sales of 1 billion units during
2016 (Apple Inc., 2016), making this product “the
most successful product of all time” (Reisinger, 2017,
para. 3). Not only has the iPhone been gener-
ating tremendous wealth for the shareholders, but
it has also disrupted the entire personal computer
paradigm and industry. From targeting a niche
market to the decade-longed so-called Post-PC era
(Press, 1999; Weiser, 1991), the iPhone and its
ecosystem offers the quintessence of an unexpected
vastly disruptive and far-reaching innovation.
1.2. Disruption: An Inevitable Destiny
It appears that being disrupted is inherent/in-
trinsic to any business endeavour, and thus unavoid-
able. That is to say, present successful disruptors
will eventually and quasi-inexorably be, in turn,
disrupted. The stratagem consists then in post-
poning the occurrence as much as value creation can
be sustained; and, in due course, gracefully exiting
(e.g., by being part of the superseding business).
High barriers to entry might delay the downfall, but
not prevent it. Agarwal and Gort (1996) substan-
tiate that, in spite of strong barriers to entry,
increased innovation and increase in market entries
are correlated.
In his book, Christensen (1997) provides numerous
examples of once renown firms praised and
acclaimed for their seemingly flawless management
and subsequent well-deserved success (e.g., Sear,
IBM, DEC and Xerox to which we can add the like
of Kodac, RIM, Nokia, Sun Microsystems); yet that
have since then either vanished altogether or are
now hostilely criticized for the disappointment they
have been causing to the stockholders. In many of
those examples, the recurrent pattern is that those
firms, while enjoying and resting on their seem-
ingly eternal laurels, failed to recognize the turning
wind (or at least failed to act on it), and in retro-
spect, many of those firms appeared to have been
adequately positioned to benefit from the new wind
direction. Those observations should justify and fuel
the fear of certain healthy companies of missing “the
next big thing”—in the words of the late former
Apple CEO Steve Jobs, who is often regarded as
a visionary and a serial disruptor (Isaacson, 2011)—
making them more inclined to collaborate1 with
potential disruptors; e.g., Google was acquiring over
one company per week on average a few years ago
(Rusli, 2011). Apple, Facebook, IBM or Microsoft,
among other titans of the Internet—a sector driven
by innovations and thus prone to disruption—are
exhibiting a similar behaviour (Wikipedia, 2017a,
2016b, 2017b,c).
1.3. Multisided Ecosystems
Multisided ecosystems revolve around platforms
that synergistically link the different sides together
(Hagiu, 2014). Throughout this paper, we use inter-
changeably the terms multisided ecosystems and
multisided platforms (although this is a slight abuse
of language, as the former concept is larger than the
latter).
Multisided platforms (MSPs) systematically exhibit,
or even are characterized by, a strong network
effect—also referred to as network externalities in
the literature (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). That is
to say, for one side, the perceived value of the MSP
increases with the sizes of the other sides. The terms
cross-side network effects or indirect network effects
are used to describe this setting—by contrast, direct
network effect of goods refers to a situation where
1The term collaborate might spur some controversies, for the
term is arguably not adequate for, e.g., hostile takeovers or
acquisitions to kill, a phenomenon often triggering heated
polemics in the specialized press—e.g., Yahoo is notorious
for this practice (Lapowsky, 2014).
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the perceived value to a user increases with the total
number of users (Hagiu, 2014).
Once well-established, an MSP enjoys a comfortable
position and is likely to last—due to the stability
offered by the network effect and switching costs
mechanisms2 (Farrell and Klemperer, 2006; Zhu and
Mitzenmacher, 2008). “[S]uccessful MSPs occupy
privileged and often hard-to-assail positions in their
respective industries” (Hagiu, 2014, p. 3). However,
establishing a successful MPS is not an easy task.
Failure at building such a platform remains the
norm (Hagiu, 2014). The so-called chicken-and-egg
problem lies at the heart of the challenge. Hagiu
(2014) identifies four critical decisions to be made:
number of sides, platform design, pricing structure
and governance rules. Rochet and Tirole (2003)
thoroughly address the pricing structure decision in
a two-sided market. It has been observed and theo-
rized that, often, the MSP must subsidize at least
one side (loss leader) to reach and sustain a crit-
ical mass of participants. Rochet and Tirole (2003)
provide a number of such occurrences, including,
e.g., platforms as diverse as video games, credit
cards, operating systems, newspapers, TV networks
and a lot more.
The concept of MSP is related to the notion of
complementor coined by Brandenburger and Nale-
buff (2011). “A complementor is the opposite of
a competitor. It’s someone who makes your prod-
ucts and services more, rather than less, valuable”
(Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 2011, Foreword). At
least one side of the platform appears as a comple-
mentor to the MSP; besides, the sides of the plat-
form other than the consumers are complementors
to one another as well (Boudreau and Hagiu, 2008).
For instance, a video game developer and a joystick
manufacturer for a given video game console plat-
form are complementors. Bear in mind, though, that
complementors are not necessarily linked via a MSP
(Gawer and Henderson, 2007).
1.4. Disruption in Multisided Ecosystems
Let’s examine why and how disruptions happen in
multisided ecosystems. Attacking a new market is
hard: “Newcomers to a business face many disad-
2Hagiu (2014) notes that the network effect alone does not
necessarily constitute a strong barrier to entry, as illus-
trated by the Groupon example which saw its valuation
plummet when investors realized the absence of switching
costs.
vantages. They lack proven products, brands, loyal
customers, manufacturing experience, and relation-
ships with suppliers. As a challenger, if you go
head-to-head with an incumbent, you’re likely to
lose”3 (Brandenburger and Nalebuff, 2011, p. 236).
Yet, the difficulty is exacerbated many folds in a
multisided environment, due to the network effects,
possible switching costs and other barriers to entry,
as discussed above.
The distinction between a new entrant as yet-
another-player in the ecosystem and a new entrant
as a potential disruptor is essential. MSPs surely
benefit from the new comers docilely filling their
role on one side of the platform, e.g., Markman and
Waldron (2014, p. 6) note that “the legions of micro
entrants, including startups, that collectively offer
more than 700, 000 iPhone and Android applications
. . . bolster Apple’s and Google’s positions in the
smart phone ecosystem.” Encouraging a multitude
of such new entrants can even constitute a divide-
and-conquer strategy in order to keep the full control
of the platform, as implemented by Nintendo, which
limited the number of games a firm could develop
per year or short-supplied retail chains (Branden-
burger and Nalebuff, 2011). By sharp contrast,
the emergence of an innovation with a potential for
disruption is most assuredly not welcomed.
Considering the tremendous difficulties to develop
a mature MSP (Hagiu, 2014), it is without
surprise that ecosystem’s participants adopt an
overly conservative stance when facing a potential
disruptor. Even if the innovative technology appears
appealing to the platform itself or to one side, the
MSP may demonstrate a high level of scepticism and
be extra-cautious, for it might have the potential
to wipe out the benefit of the platform to at least
one other critical side4, which would then jeopardize
the critical balance/link between sides, to finally
endanger the survival of the whole ecosystem. “[T]he
need to please many different and heterogeneous
3McCann and Vroom (2010) shows that the impact of new
entrants on incumbents are not always negative, and can
even be positive. However, their argumentation, largely
based on the agglomeration effect (Potter and Watts,
2010), may certainly not hold when the new entrant is
perceived as a potential disruptor.
4For example, for an MSP consisting of “one side as a profit
center and the other as a loss leader” (Rochet and Tirole,
2003, p. 2), if the technology appeals to the former, but
repel the latter. The TiVo case offers a concrete example
(Ansari et al., 2016); while TV viewers may appreciate the
option to skip advertisings, advertising companies would
desert TV network platforms, which would then, in all
likelihood, collapse.
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platform constituents greatly constrains an MSP’s
ability to innovate by introducing truly ground-
breaking features” (Hagiu, 2014, p. 5).
In spite of that, disruptions in MSP ecosystems
happen—coherently with our discussion in Section
1.2—as illustrated by the TiVo case (Ansari et al.,
2016) or by the upheaval in the music industry
caused by the advent of digitalization in the recent
decades (Easley et al., 2003; Dolata, 2011; Moreau,
2013).
This massive, to the point of being seemingly insur-
mountable, hurdle for a potential disruptor to enter
a multisided ecosystem leads to the disruptor’s
dilemma (Ansari et al., 2016). The aspirant
disruptor is doomed to failure unless it gains the
support of the ecosystem’s incumbents.
From the incumbents’ perspective. Why mighty
incumbents would deliberately collaborate with a
frail threatening challenger in lieu of proactively
crushing it straightaway? Although we do not
pretend to fully elucidate this question, various
elements of response can be advanced.
Drawing on the literature, Markman and Waldron
(2014) studied the entrant-incumbent relations, and
observed that although incumbents typically retal-
iate when a new player of comparable size attempt
an entry, they might tolerate the entry of much
smaller entrants. However, the argumentation is
based on the assumption that the “micro entrant”
has no disruptive capacity (i.e., poses no threat); an
assumption that does not hold in our context.
Intuitively, several factors can be hypothesized.
Healthy firms are constantly in the look up for
growth opportunities (ailing firms might just be
focusing on staying afloat—but reposing on similar
tactics). For a MSP, one way consists in growing
each side, while keeping an adequate balance, which
is not trivial, Hagiu (2014, p. 6) indicates that:
The most difficult MSP design decisions
are those that involve features putting the
interests of different sides of the MSP at
odds with each other or with those of the
MSP. Such features create strategic trade-
offs for the MSP because they generate
positive value for some participant groups
or for the MSP itself, but negative value
for other participant groups.
The TiVo case provides us with a perfect illustra-
tion. TiVo generates positive value to TV viewers—
advertising is quantified in terms of hindrance for
the audience (Ambrus et al., 2016; Kind et al., 2007;
Reisinger, 2012)—and negative value for advertisers.
Another example is given by Hagiu (2014) with
Microsoft and the do-not-track feature in Internet
Explorer 9.
When making those decisions, MSPs might under-
estimate the disruptive power of the new feature
(let a seemingly harmful player in). A conjecture
in line with the principles of disruptive innova-
tion elaborated by Christensen (1997). Conversely,
without underestimation, an MSP might be delib-
erately applying this principle5 (and not being a
victim of it) and see an opportunity (especially in
a context where there are competing platforms). In
other words, MSPs might anticipate their disrup-
tion, and as a remedy, thrive to be part of the super-
seding platform. The discussion in Section 1.2 about
the titans of the Internet acquiring startup compa-
nies on an industrial scale perfectly embodies this
view. In that same vein, an ailing MSP—e.g., which
might have been struggling to meet its objectives,
unable to thwart a declining position, attempting
in vain to fight emerging alternative platforms—
might have become more keen on taking risks and
thus on collaborating with its possible successor.
The implantation of the iTunes platform in the
music industry corroborates this hypothesis (Dolata,
2011).
Speculations from incumbents about the possible
success of the innovative technology might engender
keen interest in the technology. In parricular, the
fear of becoming obsolete in the ecosystem should
other participants adopt the technology—a situa-
tion somewhat akin to a Keynesian beauty contest
(Wikipedia, 2016a) and related to beliefs of higher
order (Harsanyi, 1967, 1968a,b)—might lead to a
self-fulfilling prophecy, where a number of incum-
bents start to cooperate, paving the way to success
for the disruptor. For instance, in the TiVo case,
a number of incumbents (including “AOL Time
Warner, DirecTV, CBS, NBC, and Disney”) started
to cooperate soon after its inception: “Some incum-
5It is quasi-undeniable that this work had an impact not only
in academia—according to Google Scholar the book has
been cited in a ridiculously large number of publications—
but also in the industry as well, e.g., Isaacson (2011)
reveals that Steve Jobs—who has taken over the helm of
the soon-to-go-bankrupt Apple and made it the most valu-
able company in the world in terms of market cap—was
influenced by it.
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bents were prompted to engage due to a desire to
“keep tabs” on TiVo’s new technology as well as the
threat it posed to them” (Ansari et al., 2016, p. 10).
From the potential disruptor’s perspective. In
the context of a multisided ecosystem consisting of
various sides (themselves formed by a multiplicity of
competitors), it appears that one strategy consists
for the potential disruptor in gaining a critical mass
of supporters as soon as possible; as quoted by
Ansari et al. (2016, p. 11) in the TiVo case:
The long-term success of TiVo depends
on its ability to quickly build a large
subscriber base, integrate its function-
ality into a broad range of consumer elec-
tronics products, and develop new services
and programming to enhance the TiVo
service. In order to achieve these goals,
the company has aggressively pursued
strategic partnerships with cable and satel-
lite network operators, television program-
mers, consumer electronics manufacturers,
marketing support partners and suppliers
of key components of the TiVo technology
(Miller, 2000, p. 12).
The disruptor’s dilemma is, in essence, ingrained
in the concept of coopetition (Brandenburger and
Nalebuff, 2011). As maintained by Ansari et al.
(2016), the potential disruptor must shrewdly
promulgate information in order (i) to convince
incumbents that they will find long-term benefits—
“intertemporal coopetition”—(ii) to lessen the
perceived threat—“dyadic coopetition”—and (iii)
to smooth out friction between incumbents—
“multilateral coopetition”—caused by one side’s
favourable attitude towards the disruptor upsetting
other sides (Hagiu, 2014).
2. A Global Game Model of the
Disruptor’s Dilemma
Global games—a sphere of activity belonging to
the realms of game theory and economics—are
games of incomplete information first introduced by
Carlsson and van Damme (1993)6, and subsequently
furthered by Morris and Shin (2001); Frankel et al.
(2003) and others (Angeletos and Pavan, 2013).
6Carlsson and van Damme (1993) coined the term global
games.
Each player receives perturbed signals from which
it7 derives an optimal action. As formulated by
Morris and Shin (2001, p. 4), global games represent
an environment where:
Uncertain economic fundamentals are
summarized by a state θ and each player
observes a different signal of the state with
a small amount of noise. Assuming that
the noise technology is common knowledge
among players, each player’s signal gener-
ates beliefs about fundamentals, beliefs
about other players’ beliefs about funda-
mental, and so on.
Global games of regime change—a sub-discipline of
global games—are coordination games of incomplete
information in which a status quo is abandoned in
favour of its alternative when a sufficiently large
mass/fraction of agents decides to support the alter-
native.
Such games appear particularly well suited for
concocting a somewhat reasonable mathematical
representation of the disruptor’s dilemma. As we
elaborated earlier (see Section 1), the success of a
disruptive innovation (i.e., the aspirant disruptor)
depends on the number of incumbents that decide
to support it. At the outset, the status quo is
defined by the current technology on which the
multisided ecosystem reposes. When face with
an alternative—potentially disruptive—technology,
each incumbent must decide whether to support it
or to ignore it. If, eventually, the new technology is
adopted and supersedes the status quo, the incum-
bents that contributed to its success receive a posi-
tive payoff; whereas the ones that ignored it (in
practice, even fought it—see Section 3.2 for further
discussion on that point) incur a cost (e.g., dete-
rioration of their positions on the market, to the
point of ultimately declaring bankruptcy). This
cost embodies the disruptive power of the innova-
tion. By contrast, should the new technology turn
unsuccessful, the incumbents that supported it lose
the amount they contributed, whereas the ones that
ignored it remain unimpacted. To take action, each
incumbent receives both public and private infor-
mation entangled with noise. In practice, this infor-
mation is disseminated by the potential disruptor—
7Throughout this paper the terms agent, player and incum-
bent are used interchangeably; besides, to solve any gender
ambiguity that may surface, the neutral personal pronouns
it is used in place of those terms when the grammatical
structure allows.
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e.g., in the TiVo case, “[they] hired an executive
familiar with the media industry to reach out to
ecosystem incumbents and emphasize the poten-
tial benefits of its DVR” (Ansari et al., 2016, p.
10) or “[they] launched an aggressive $150 million
marketing campaign” (Ansari et al., 2016, p. 11).
One can remark that the former quote describes a
private channel, while the latter describes a public
channel.
2.1. Related Literature
Applications of global games abound in the litera-
ture, e.g., Morris and Shin (1998) and Hellwig et al.
(2006) study currency attacks; Dasgupta (2007)
presents project investment decisions; Chamley
(1999) addresses the problem of economic regime
switch; Argenziano (2005), Angeletos et al. (2007)
and Edmond (2013) examine political regimes
change; Angeletos et al. (2006) discuss financial
crises; Dewan and Myatt (2007) concentrate on
party leadership; Angeletos and Pavan (2004) deal
with social welfare; Goldstein and Pauzner (2005),
Rochet and Vives (2004) and Zwart (2007) tackle
bank run phenomena and debt crises.
Typically, those works strive to determine condi-
tions (e.g., on the information structure) that yield
a unique equilibrium (Angeletos and Pavan, 2013),
for a multiplicity of equilibria is often of little help
in many situations due to the non-unicity of the
plausible outcome (Morris and Shin, 1998; Hellwig,
2002). “[I]t is hard to base any policy recommenda-
tion on their model, since it systematically possesses
multiple equilibria” (Rochet and Vives, 2004, p. 3).
We do not follow this pattern; instead, we observe
the influence of various parameters on the model
behaviour via simulations. Indeed, a notable differ-
ence between our work and most of the contribu-
tions in this discipline arises from our simulation-
based approach as opposed to formal mathemat-
ical proofs. Although we appreciate the benefits
brought about by formal demonstrations—as obser-
vations from simulations do not provide tangible
evidences of correctness, and thus cannot be general-
ized beyond the experimental context—we contend
that extensive simulations provide a solid insight
that can be of significance in a practical context.
The model discussed throughout this section is
a rather typical global game model as described
in the work of Carlsson and van Damme (1993);
Chamley (1999); Angeletos et al. (2007); Morris and
Shin (1998); Edmond (2013); Argenziano (2005) and
others. However, the nearest model to the one
introduced below is the one presented by Angeletos
et al. (2007). In particular, the same assumptions of
normality for parameters are made (with the same
motivations). For clarity—and ease to refer to their
work for additional details and various proofs—we
use (almost) the same notations. In our model,
the payoff structure slightly differs, though, for we
introduce a possible loss for incumbents that decide
not to support the potential disruptor. Further-
more, in the dynamic version of the game, we use
the previous number of supporters as a public and
private information, and the number of supporters is
cumulated over the periods (translating the fact that
once an incumbent decides to support the potential
disruptor, it cannot retract itself later on).
Our work also presents some similarities with the
dynamics of project investment decisions studied by
Dasgupta (2007); he discusses a two-period global
game where agents can decide either to invest during
the first period (with the prospect of a higher payoff)
or to invest during the second one (with more accu-
rate private information, but a lower payoff). His
model assumes that, during the first period, each
agent takes into account the possibility to invest
during the second period in its decision-making
process. By sharp contrast, in our model, the incum-
bents do not anticipate a possible next round of
opportunity; besides, in our model, not only private,
but also public signals from previous rounds are
observed.
2.2. Modelling the Disruptor’s Dilemma
We consider a uniformly distributed continuum of
incumbents [0, 1]. Incumbents make decision simul-
taneously and are risk-neutral. Each incumbent i
must decide whether it supports or not the poten-
tial disruptor; the boolean variable si ∈ {0, 1} repre-
sents that decision. Table 1 summarizes the payoff.
If i decides to support the potential disruptor (i.e.,
si = 1) a cost c ∈ [0, 1] is incurred. This invest-
ment is lost if the potential disruptor at last fails; if,
however, it becomes eventually successful, i receives
a payoff of 1−c > 0. Alternatively, if i decides not to
support the potential disruptor, i.e., s1 = 0, it risks
incurring a loss b ∈ [0, 1], should the disruptor be
eventually successful—and a payoff of zero, other-
wise. Figure 1 depicts a decision tree of the game.
Let p denotes the probability of the potential
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disruptor to succeed. The incumbent i would
support the disruptor if and only if
(1− c)p− c(1− p) > −bp
i.e., p > c
1 + b
.(1)
The potential disruptor is successful if and only if
the aggregate value of supporters
(2) S =
∫ 1
0
sk dk
is greater than a threshold θ ∈ [0, 1]. The parameter
θ embodies the hurdle for the potential disruptor to
succeed.
As mentioned earlier, b embodies the disruptive
effect; θ, on the other hand, symbolizes the strength
of the status quo, which is connected to the barriers
to entry, in particular the network effect (Zhu and
Mitzenmacher, 2008).
If it is publicly known that θ = 0, the poten-
tial disruptor does not require any support to be
successful8; and thus, all incumbents will support
it, as otherwise they will become obsolete (a fact
expressed by the negative payoff −b). At the other
extreme, if θ = 1, the potential disruptor will fail
regardless of the support it may receive; hence no
incumbent will support it (as otherwise the incum-
bent would lose the efforts invested in its support
initiative, translated by the negative payoff −c).
Let s = (sk)k∈[0,1] denotes the decision profile over
all incumbents. Incumbent i’s payoff is given by:
ui(s, θ) =
(
1{S>θ} − c
)
si −
(
1{S>θ} − si
)
b
+
(
1{S>θ} − 1
)
sib
= 1{S>θ} (si(1 + b)− b)− csi,(3)
where 1{·} is the indicator function.
As noted by Angeletos et al. (2007), if θ is a public
information precisely known by all incumbents, two
pure-strategy equilibria exist: either all incumbents
support the potential disruptor (i.e., S = 1) or none
of them does (i.e., S = 0).
In practice, however, θ is not known, and each
incumbent has a mixture of noisy public and private
information to make its choice.
8Barring any idiosyncratic risks, which are not considered in
the presented model.
Table 1: Payoff for incumbent i
success (S > θ) failure (S < θ)
support (si = 1) 1− c −c
not support (si = 0) −b 0
Support?
Success?
0
no
1− p
−byes
p
no
0
Success?
−c
no
1− p
1-cyes
p
yes
−c
Figure 1: Decision tree for incumbent i
2.2.1. Static Game
At the outset, Nature randomly choses θ from a
common prior probability distribution
(4) N (z, 1/α),
i.e., assumed to be commonly known by all incum-
bents.
Further to the shared prior, each incumbent i
receives a private information
(5) xi = θ + εi,
with the noise parameter
(6) εi ∼ N
(
0,
1
β
)
independent and identically distributed across the
population.
As described by Angeletos et al. (2007), “[t]he
Normality assumptions allow us to parameterize the
information structure parsimoniously with (β, α, z),
that is, the precision of private information, the
precision of the common prior, and the mean of the
common prior.”
Monotone equilibrium. A monotone strategy is a
strategy for which there exists a threshold value
below which the incumbent decides one action,
and above which it decides the alternative action.
More formally, an incumbent i follows a monotone
strategy if it exists x?i ∈ R such that si = 1 if and
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only if xi 6 x?i . A symmetric Bayesian Nash equi-
librium in monotone strategies (simply referred to
as monotone equilibrium thereafter) has a threshold
x? that is common to all the incumbents (hence the
term symmetric):
(7) ∃ x? ∈ R | ∀i ∈ [0, 1], si =
{
1 iff xi 6 x?
0 otherwise.
When an incumbent i (at equilibrium, i.e., xi = x?)
decides to support the potential disruptor, it rightly
believes that all the other incumbents j that have
received a signal xj 6 x? decide to support the
potential disruptor as well (Dasgupta, 2007).
Assuming the existence of x?, the measure of incum-
bents that decide to support the potential disruptor
S is a function of θ and is given by:
(8) S(θ) = Pr (x 6 x? | θ) ,
which, given our assumption (6), becomes
(9) S(θ) = Φ
(√
β (x? − θ)
)
,
where Φ : R → [0, 1] denotes the cumulative distri-
bution function for the normal distribution.
Recalling that the potential disruptor is successful if
and only if S(θ) > θ and following the same devel-
opment as the one presented by Angeletos et al.
(2007), one can observe that S : R→ [0, 1] is strictly
decreasing in θ; therefore, the potential disruptor
becomes successful if and only if θ 6 θ?, where
θ? ∈ R solves for θ the equation θ = S(θ).
From assumptions (4) and (6), the posterior—or
updated—distribution for θ given observation (5) is
(by Bayesian normal updating):
(10) N
(
βxi + αz
β + α
,
1
β + α
)
.
Incumbent i believes that the posterior probability
of success for the potential disruptor is yielded by
Pr (θ 6 θ? | xi) =
Φ
(√
β + α
(
θ? − βxi + αz
β + α
))
.(11)
The function p : xi 7→ Pr(θ 6 θ? | xi) is decreasing,
and from equation (1), one can derive that the
incumbent i offers its support if and only if p(xi) >
c/(1 + b), i.e., if and only if xi 6 x?, where x? ∈ R
solves p(x?) = c/(1 + b).
Figure 2: Monotone equilibrium (x?, θ?) given by the solution of
the system of equations (12).
Figure 3: θ? and x? as a function of c for various values of b.
It follows that a monotone equilibrium is given by
the solution (x?, θ?) of the following system of equa-
tions:
(12)

Φ
(√
β (x? − θ?)
)
= θ?
Φ
(√
β + α
(
θ? − βx
? + αz
β + α
))
=
c
1 + b
.
An incumbent i supports the potential disruptor if
and only if xi 6 x?; and the potential disruptor is
successful if and only if θ 6 θ?. Figure 2 shows the
curves p : x 7→ Pr(θ 6 θ? | x) and S : θ 7→ Pr(x 6
x? | θ).
Angeletos et al. (2007) prove that the equilibrium
exists and is unique for all z ∈ R if and only if β >
α2/(2pi). Although our payoff structure differs from
theirs, the proof remains valid and the conclusion
unchanged.
A few observations. Figure 3 depicts the impact
of the cost to support on the equilibrium; as dictated
by intuition, the higher the cost, the less likely
the potential disruptor gains supporters. This is
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Figure 4: θ? and x? as a function of z for various values of c.
Figure 5: Monotone equilibria. The difference between the left graph and the right graph is the value of b (in the left graph, there is no
downside not to support the potential disruptor). A continuous line connotes the fact that the equilibrium is unique, whereas
the points—the triangles and ‘×’ for x?(β), and circles and ‘+’ for β?(β)—show equilibrium that are not unique.
Figure 6: Number of supporters S as a function of θ in a scenario
where there are three equilibria.
balanced, though, with the loss incurred when not
supporting a successful disruptor (i.e., b). For
instance, assuming z = 0.5, if c = b = 1, then
(β?, x?) = (0.5, 0.5).
Figure 4 illustrates the effect of the strength of
the status quo (i.e., the difficulty for the potential
disruptor to succeed). It shows that when the payoff
of supporting is null (c = 1), incumbents have still
some incentive to support the potential disruptor in
order to avoid the downside of not supporting while
it eventually succeeds (i.e., a loss of b). Evidently,
Figure 7: Number of supporters S as a function of θ, with a some-
what low precision (left) and a rather high precision
(right) of the private signal.
at the other extreme, when there is no cost to
support the potential disruptor (c = 0), all incum-
bents support it.
Figure 5 depicts the non-unicity of equilibria when
the condition β > α2/(2pi) is not satisfied. Figure
6 gives the number of supporters in yet another
example of such a situation.
Figure 7 shows that when the precision is high (little
noise on the private signal—i.e., β is large), a small
variation in θ can lead to a rapid and drastic reversal
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of situations. This phenomenon is described in
detail elsewhere (Angeletos and Werning, 2006).
2.2.2. Two-Round Game
We update the static game discussed in the previous
section 2.2.1 so that when the potential disruptor
does not receive a sufficient number of supporters
during the first round, a second round is organized.
We consider, thus, two time periods t1 and t2 > t1.
The first round at t1 is equivalent to the static game
described above. Should the first round turn unsuc-
cessful for the potential disruptor (i.e., S(θ) < θ?),
a second round is considered. The incumbents that
decided to support the potential disruptor during
the first round are still supporting it during the
second round (i.e., once an incumbent has decided
to offer its support, it cannot reverse its decision—
in yet other words, the decision to support is irre-
vocable). The existence of a possible second round
is not anticipated by the incumbents at period t1.
Note that this is in sharp contrast with the work
of Dasgupta (2007), in which the agents can antic-
ipate the possibility to play a second round from
the outset. However, if a second round is indeed
organized, the incumbents receive both public and
private information from the outcome of the first
round (namely the measure of incumbents that are
supporting the potential disruptor).
Supporting the potential disruptor at t2 entails a
“penalty” of ω on the payoff should the disruptor
eventually succeed; in that case, the payoff is 1 −
ω − c, with 0 6 ω 6 1− c.
Let si,t ∈ {0, 1} denotes the decision of incumbent
i at period t, and St ∈ [0, 1] the measure of incum-
bents that support the potential disruptor at period
t. At period t, the potential disruptor becomes
successful if and only if St > θ.
The accumulated information at period t2 is two-
fold: a private signal about θ and both a public and
a private signals about the measure of supporters
St1(θ) observed in the previous period.
At each period t, each incumbent i (that has yet to
decide) receives a private signal
(13) x˜i,t = θ + εi,t,
where
(14) εi,t ∼ N
(
0,
1
ηt
)
is independent and identically distributed across the
entire population of incumbents.
At t2, we assume that each incumbent has collected
information about the size of the supporters
observed at t1. The same normality assumption as in
the work of Dasgupta (2007) are made9. At period
t2, a public signal
(15) ψt2 = Φ
−1(St1) + ξt2
is received by all incumbents, where
(16) ξt2 ∼ N
(
0,
1
δt2
)
.
Furthermore, a private signal
(17) ϕi,t2 = Φ
−1(St1) + υi,t2
is received by incumbent i, where
(18) υi,t2 ∼ N
(
0,
1
γt2
)
is independent and identically distributed across the
entire population of incumbents.
Monotone equilibrium. At period t1, incumbents
decide to support the potential disruptor as in the
static game discussed above, and the measure of
supporters is yielded by
(19) St1(θ) = Φ
(√
βt1
(
x?t1 − θ
))
,
where βt1 = ηt1 .
In the same vein as for the static game discussed
above, the potential disruptor succeeds if and only
if θ 6 θ?t1 , where θ?t1 ∈ R solves θ?t1 = St1(θ?t1);
and incumbent i supports the potential disruptor
if and only if x˜i,t1 6 x?t1 , where x?t1 ∈ R solves
Pr(θ 6 θ?t1 | x?t1) = c/(1 + b)—equation (11) gives
a closed-form expression of the right-hand side of
this equation.
If θ > θ?t1 , then a second round occurs at t2,
during which incumbent i receives the three addi-
tional signals x˜i,t2 , ϕi,t2 and ψt2 .
From equations (15) and (17), it follows that
ψt2 =
√
βt1
(
x?t1 − θ
)
+ ξt2(20)
ϕi,t2 =
√
βt1
(
x?t1 − θ
)
+ υi,t2(21)
9Dasgupta (2007) assumes that the signal received by the
agents at t2 regarding the ratio of agents that did partic-
ipate at t1 is private. By contrast, we assume that the
agents receive two signals, one private and one public.
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We adapt the reasoning presented by Angeletos et al.
(2007) in their online supplement; the posterior
belief of incumbent i about θ | x˜i,t1 , x˜i,t2 , ϕi,t2 , ψt2
is (by Bayes’s rule)
(22) N
(
βt2xi,t2 + αt2zt2
βt2 + αt2
,
1
βt2 + αt2
)
,
with
βt2 = βt1 + ηt2 + βt1γt2(23)
αt2 = α+ βt1δt2(24)
and
xi,t2 =
βt1 x˜i,t1 + ηt2 x˜i,t2
βt2
+
βt1γt2
βt2
(
x?t1 −
ϕi,t2√
βt1
)
(25)
zt2 =
αt1z
αt2
+
βt1δt2
αt2
(
x?t1 −
ψt2√
βt1
)
.(26)
A monotone equilibrium is characterized by the exis-
tence of x?t2 ∈ R such that si,t2 = 1 if and only
if xi,t2 6 x?t2 . Each incumbent i receives the new
signals x˜i,t2 , ϕi,t2 and ψt2 ; however St1(θ) of them
already made the irrevocable decision to support
the potential disruptor at period t1—hence only
1− St1(θ) of them have yet to decide. The measure
of supporters at t2 is then given by:
St2(θ) = St1(θ)
+ (1− St1(θ))Pr
(
x 6 x?t2
∣∣ θ) .(27)
At period t2 the precision of the private informa-
tion increases due to the newly received signals
(Angeletos et al., 2007)—see Equation (23)—and we
have
Pr
(
x 6 x?t2
∣∣ θ) =
Φ
(√
βt2
(
x?t2 − θ
))
.(28)
Given that St2 is decreasing in θ (see Appendix A),
the potential disruptor becomes successful at t2 if
and only θ 6 θ?t2 , where θ?t2 ∈ R solves for θ the
equation
(29) θ = St2(θ).
Let us consider the function xi,t2 : x˜i,t2 7→
xi,t2(x˜i,t2), which is unambiguously defined from
(25), and the function p : x 7→ Pr(θ 6 θ?t2 | x, θ >
θ?t1). One can observe that the function x 7→ p ◦
x˜i,t2(x) is strictly decreasing. It follows that incum-
bent i supports the potential disruptor at t2 if and
only if it exists x?t2 ∈ R such that xi,t2 6 x?t2 and
(30) Pr
(
θ 6 θ?t2
∣∣ x?t2 , θ > θ?t1) = c1− ω + b .
Using the updated posterior belief about θ given by
Equation (22),
Pr
(
θ 6 θ?t2
∣∣ x?t2 , θ > θ?t1)
=
Pr
(
θ 6 θ?t2 , θ > θ?t1
∣∣ x?t2)
Pr
(
θ > θ?t1
∣∣ x?t2)
= 1−
Φ
(√
βt2 + αt2
(
βt2x
?
t2
+αt2zt2
βt2+αt2
− θ?t2
))
Φ
(√
βt2 + αt2
(
βt2x
?
t2
+αt2zt2
βt2+αt2
− θ?t1
)) .
Substituting x?t2 with x in this expression gives a
closed-form expression of the function f : x 7→ p ◦
x˜i,t2(x). As observed by Angeletos et al. (2007) in a
comparable setting, the function f is continuous and
strictly decreasing; furthermore, limx→−∞ f(x) = 1
and limx→+∞ f(x) = 0, therefore assuming that
c/(1 − ω + b) ∈ ]0, 1], a solution x?t2 for Equation
(30) exists.
As discussed by Angeletos et al. (2007) for signals
about past attacks—see their online supplement as
well—and observed from Equations (30) and (26),
at period t2, the thresholds (θ?t2 , x
?
t2) are functions
of ψt2 ; a monotone equilibrium is therefore char-
acterized by (θ?t1 , x
?
t1) ∈ R2 and (θ?t2 , x?t2), where
θ?t2 : R→ [0, 1] and x?t2 : R→ R.
Assuming δt2 = 0, i.e., assuming that the incum-
bents do not receive any further public information
during the second round10, the monotone equilibria
are of the form {(θ?t1 , x?t1), (θ?t2 , x?t2)}, where (θ?t1 , x?t1)
is a solution of the system (12) and (θ?t2 , x
?
t2) ∈ R2
is a solution of the system of equations
(31)
θ
?
t2 = St2(θ?t2)
Pr
(
θ 6 θ?t2
∣∣ x?t2 , θ > θ?t1) = c1− ω + b ,
with the constraint that θ?t2 > θ
?
t1 , for we know that
θ > θ?t1 , otherwise there would be no second round.
From the lemma 2 of Angeletos et al. (2007) we can
infer that a solution to (31) does not always exist
(depending on the value of θ?t1 and βt2). Besides,
when a solution exists, it may not be unique.
10If δt2 = 0, then, from Equation (26), zt2 = z, i.e., zt2 no
longer depends on ψt2 .
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(a) θ? and x? as a function of c for different
values of b.
(b) θ? and x? as a function of z for different
values of c.
Figure 8: The dashed blue line represents θ?t1 , the dashed green line
represents x?t1 , the blue circles represent θ
?
t2
and the green
triangles represent θ?t2 .
A few observations. We conducted some simu-
lations during which we assume δt2 = 0, i.e., we
assumed that, at t2, the incumbents only receive
private information about the mass of incumbents
that decided to support the potential disruptor
during the first round.
Figure 8 depicts the presence of multiple equilibria.
Although we have not investigated the conditions
under which an equilibrium exists, and when it
exists the conditions that guarantee its unicity, our
rather extensive set of simulations revealed that
system (31) has either no solution11 or exactly two
11We have relied on nleqslv r’s package (https://goo.gl/
9eoEO0) to implement a numerical method to solve (31)—
and draw the various graphs presented throughout this
paper. It is essential to bear in mind that no solution
found does not necessarily means that the system has
no solution; it might be simply due to some anomalies
caused by numerical limitations. Likewise, found solutions
might not exist in theory, but given a tolerable error those
solutions are acceptable in practice; having said that, we
Figure 9: Number of supporters St1 and St2 as a function of θ,
with a somewhat low precision (top—ηt2 = γt2 = 5) and
a rather high precision (bottom—ηt2 = γt2 = 1000) of
the private signal in the second round.
solutions. Angeletos et al. (2007) study in depth
multiplicity of equilibria—see, e.g., Theorems 1 &
2—however, their model differs from ours to the
point that there is no obvious adaptation.
Figure 9 illustrates again that when the precision is
high in the second round (i.e., ηt2 and γt2 are large),
a slight variation in θ leads to radically different
outcomes. A “crisis” situation often observed in
global-game applications (Angeletos and Werning,
2006; Angeletos et al., 2007).
Multiplicity of equilibria. Multiple equilibria in
global games, and more broadly in games with
imperfect information, has already received much
attention among scholars (Angeletos and Pavan,
2013; Carlsson and Van Damme, 1989; Carlsson and
van Damme, 1993; Angeletos et al., 2006; Morris and
Shin, 2000; Myatt and Wallace, 2002; Morris and
Shin, 2001; Morris et al., 2016; Cho and Kreps, 1987;
Morris and Shin, 1998; Kohlberg et al., 1986; Chas-
sang, 2010; Zwart, 2007; Hellwig, 2002; Harsanyi,
1995; Cabrales et al., 2007; Diamond and Dybvig,
1983; Obstfeld, 1986), and is regarded as an unde-
sirable setting, for it is propitious for coordination
failures. Hellwig (2002, p. 2) asserts that:
Equilibrium multiplicity makes it impos-
sible to draw determinate economic predic-
tions or policy implications from dynamic
obtain a minimum number of solutions, for other solutions
might exist, but not found by the algorithm—this scenario
remains rather unlikely, though.
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analysis or comparative statics, and qual-
itative conclusions are often restricted to
informal predictions as to how policies may
alter expectations or act as a coordination
device towards one equilibrium.
Tamer (2003, p. 2) observes that “[t]o avoid multi-
plicity, economists studying these models [with a
multiplicity of equilibria] have simplifying assump-
tions which either change the outcome space or
impose ad hoc selection mechanisms in regions of
multiplicity.”
The two observed equilibria in Figure 8 suggest the
possibility of conflicting scenario. A situation in
which the potential disruptor fails (i.e., a coordina-
tion failure), even though the underlying fundamen-
tals were favourable for its success, becomes conceiv-
able.
2.2.3. Multi-Round Game (Dynamic Game)
The two-round game detailed above can be gener-
alized to n-round game, with n ∈ N>2. One can
observe that the cumulative measure of the incum-
bents supporting the potential disruptor over time
is recursively given by
Stn(θ) = Stn−1(θ)
+
(
1− Stn−1(θ)
)× Pr (x 6 x?tn ∣∣ θ) ,(32)
with
(33) Pr
(
x 6 x?tn
∣∣ θ) = Φ(√βtn (x?tn − θ)) ,
with ∀k ∈ J1 . . nK, βtk = βtk−1 + ηtk + βtk−1γtk and
βt1 = ηt1 (Angeletos et al., 2007).
However, it appears that devising a closed-form
expression of both ψtn and ϕi,tn at period tn with
n > 2 is not trivial—due to the non-linearity of Φ
in equations (15) and (17). We do not detail any
further the n-round game in the scope of this paper.
3. Discussions
3.1. Interpretation of the Findings
Our model suggests that (i) the existence of a unique
equilibrium can be guaranteed during the first round
on the condition that a sufficiently precise private
information relative to the precision of the initial
common prior is received by the incumbents (i.e.,
β > α2/(2pi), see Section 2.2.1); and (ii) during the
second round, the new information derived from the
outcome of the first round leads to multiple equi-
libria (or possibly no equilibrium).
One can note that, depending on the economic
fundamentals, a unique equilibrium is not synony-
mous with success; but simply indicates that the
assumed rational incumbents are expected to coor-
dinate their action choices—hence a predictable
behaviour. Likewise, a multiplicity of equilibria does
not necessarily imply that the potential disruptor is
doomed; it may, however, face major setbacks due to
plausible coordination failures even when the funda-
mentals are favourable for its success.
Those observations point to one credible strategy
that consists for the potential disruptor in astutely
orchestrating information dissemination, at the very
outset, so as to ensure the existence of a unique
equilibrium—and thus to aid the incumbents to
successfully coordinate their actions. If the under-
lying economic fundamentals permit (i.e., θ is not
too high), the potential disruptor may then increase
its chance of success during the first round.
3.2. Limitations
As already mentioned earlier, the presented model
may be somewhat deficient in substantive elabora-
tion; it is, however, well aligned with the noted Box’s
aphorism about models’ inherent wrongness: “Since
all models are wrong the scientist cannot obtain
a “correct” one by excessive elaboration. On the
contrary . . . he should seek an economical descrip-
tion of natural phenomena” (Box, 1976, p. 792).
Global games constitute a reasonable means of
obtaining this economical description of a consider-
ably complex phenomenon; as puts by Morris and
Shin (2001, p. 4): “[O]ptimal strategic behavior
should be analyzed in the space of all possible infi-
nite hierarchies of beliefs; however, such analysis
is highly complex for players and analysts alike
and is likely to prove intractable in general.” The
trade-off between tractability and complexity seems
appropriate judging from the plethora of global
game applications reported in the literature (see,
e.g., Morris and Shin, 1998; Chamley, 1999; Hellwig
et al., 2006; Angeletos et al., 2006; Zwart, 2007;
Angeletos et al., 2007; Angeletos and Pavan, 2013,
and others).
Nevertheless, focusing specifically on the disruptor’s
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dilemma, some assumptions might render the model
overly stylized. Especially considering that our
model appears to never yield a unique equilibrium
during the second round12. Tamer (2003, p. 5)
qualifies such models with non-unique equilibrium
as incomplete econometric models and notes that
the “incompleteness is often the result of the unwill-
ingness to impose strong (and sometimes untestable)
assumptions.”
The following paragraphs discuss some assumptions
that, we believe, could be refined.
Incumbents’ resistance. The assumption that
incumbents can either support the potential
disruptor or just ignore it is far-fetched. In practice,
they might immediately retaliate via, e.g., smear
campaigns and other demeaning manoeuvres. The
Ansari et al. (2016, p. 9)’s quote illustrates this
attitude:
And, when they [ecosystem incumbents]
saw this thing [TiVo’s DVR], they’d just
go completely nuts . . . (and show) every
emotion [such as] . . . anger, hate . . . And
not only did they have a negative reaction
and throw us out of their office . . . but
they talked to the press . . . and would tell
them that we were evil and that, if this
took off, it was going to have a massive
negative impact on the US economy, and
all sorts of doomsday kind of statements
(iinnovate.blogspot.com, 2016).
Such denigratory initiatives could be regarded as
a mixture of public news (Angeletos et al., 2007)
and information manipulation (Edmond, 2013). In
effect, this amounts to different channels divulging
somewhat diverging or even conflicting information
about the fundamentals. Such information chan-
nels should not be ignored, for they may have the
potential to achieve remarkable turnarounds. For
example, in a context fairly comparable to a regime
change situation, the very recent US presidential
election was the arena of numerous controversies
12A loose conclusion inferred from simulations in which only
additional private signal is considered (e.g., δt2 = 0).
However, Angeletos et al. (2007) already formally demon-
strated that in a dynamic setting with public signals
(e.g., public news), “there always exist multiple equilibria”
(Angeletos et al., 2007, p. 23, theorem 2), a result that
we would then observe when δt2 > 0—“[t]he multiplicity
result of Theorem 2 thus extends directly” (Angeletos
et al., 2007, online supplement, p. 2) to games with signals
about the size of past attacks.
with regards to fake news that supposedly influ-
enced the outcome; Allcott and Gentzkow (2017)
examine this case and support the allegations: “We
confirm that fake news was both widely shared
and tilted in favor of Donald Trump” (Allcott and
Gentzkow, 2017, p. 3).
Payoff structure. The payoff structure (see Table
1) assumes that if an incumbent i supports the
disruptor, which eventually succeeds, then i is
rewarded. This assumption is crucial in the incum-
bents’ decision. However, the reality may not reflect
this assumption. The main issue lies in the fact
that it is not easy to know the distribution of bene-
fits after the occurrence of a disruption; that is to
say that even though an incumbent does offer its
support, it might find itself in trouble if the tech-
nology eventually becomes successful. A credible
scenario which might repel potential supporters as
expressed by Ansari et al. (2016, p. 10): “Partic-
ularly threatening to incumbents is the uncertainty
over how the disruptor’s innovation will redistribute
revenues and profits among ecosystem members.
Consequently, it is likely that the newcomer will not
gain support for its innovation.”
3.3. Future Works
Although the points raised in Section 3.2 should be
addressed in the future, in this subsection we focus
on the immediate next steps we see would be of great
significance to complement the work that has been
presented throughout this paper.
Signalling. As discussed in Section 2, the informa-
tion received by incumbents is (partly) communi-
cated by the potential disruptor. It is the case that
this has a cost for the potential disruptor—which
has limited resources. For example, TiVo committed
a weighty amount of resources to reach incum-
bents, via, e.g., TV commercials (public signal):
“TiVo launched an aggressive $150 million marketing
campaign” (Ansari et al., 2016, p. 11); or the hire
of executives (private signal): “TiVo hired an execu-
tive familiar with the media industry to reach out to
ecosystem incumbents” (Ansari et al., 2016, p. 10).
This cost incurred by the potential disruptor, moti-
vated by its expected subsequent payoff, should be
captured by the model; which would then include
two payoff structures, the one for incumbents—
already in our current model, see Table 1—and the
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one for the potential disruptor. Such considera-
tions have already been studied, e.g., see the work of
Angeletos and Pavan (2013), Angeletos et al. (2006)
and Edmond (2013). Those previous works could
serve as a starting point to enhance our model.
Anticipation of subsequent rounds. Our model
substantially reposes on the assumption that incum-
bents do not anticipate a new opportunity for
deciding whether or not to support the potential
disruptor. Their decision is taken from observing
past outcomes only. This assumption might appear
overly restrictive, for it is easy to conceive that,
during their first encounter with the new technology,
incumbents expect/anticipate ulterior possibilities
to be involved.
A conception corroborated by the TiVo case: “[T]he
persistence required [by the potential disruptor] to
forge such relational ties [with incumbents] despite
being rebuffed repeatedly” (Ansari et al., 2016)
strongly suggests an acknowledged (by both parties)
multi-round process from the outset. It is worth
bearing in mind, though, that in our model, the
concept of rounds/periods (like t1 and t2) differs
from a temporal snapshot—i.e., a single point on
a linear representation of time, as often in phys-
ical sciences—but is rather subjectively defined by
a set of somewhat related (in some sense) events
taking place in a rather narrowly bounded period
of time. Consequently, one could argue that those
“repeated” attempts at convincing incumbents in
the TiVo case belong to the same round (i.e., each
attempt does not constitute a single round). Never-
theless, even with this loose view of a round (which
may only weaken the TiVo illustration set forth
above), the question of anticipating the next rounds
when making a decision in the current one remains
fully valid.
Dasgupta (2007) presents a global game in which
participants have the option to delay their decision
(which incurs a cost). “Agents will thus rationally
trade off the possible excess gains to choosing early
against the option value of waiting and choosing
with more information at t2” (Dasgupta, 2007, p.
7). His model assumes only a private signal during
the first period, and a second private signal (a
noisy information conveying the size of agents that
have already decided to invest) during the second
one. Besides, his presented development heavily
reposes on the fact that there are exactly two periods
(an assumption that greatly simplifies the matter).
Enriching the model by adding public information
and an unknown number of future rounds appears
not trivial (to say it euphemistically).
To maintain the parsimony of our model, it may be
judicious to limit the number of rounds to a fixed
value (e.g., two or three) assumed to be known by
all incumbents. Doing so would allow us to adapt a
similar approach as the one of Dasgupta (2007).
Formal proofs. To follow the pattern observed in
the global game literature, we need to devise formal
proofs of the results suggested by our simulations,
and formally determine both the precise number of
equilibria and the exact conditions that lead to those
equilibria.
4. Concluding Remarks
In the course of this paper, we have extensively
discussed the dilemma a potential disruptor faces
when attempting to introduce its innovation in a
mature mutlisided ecosystem which revolved around
an MSP. We have observed that, in spite of occu-
pying a seemingly unassailable position, MSP are
eventually inexorably disrupted. We have then
presented a global coordination game of incomplete
information (more specifically, a global game of
regime change) in an attempt to model the complex
dynamics behind the disruptor’s dilemma.
Our model assumes a multi-round game where
incumbents can decide, during each round, to irre-
vocably support the potential disruptor; which
succeeds if and only if a critical mass of supporters
is reached. Incumbents make their decision based
on their belief formed from both public and private
information communicated (in whole or in part) by
the potential disruptor. A two-round game has
been presented in detail, whereas only key aspects
of the general case have been suggested. While
the first round exhibits a unique monotone equi-
librium provided a sufficiently precise information
structure, the second round seem to systematically
have multiple equilibria (or possibly no equilibrium).
In such a setting, incumbents may fail to coordinate
on the same strategy. Consequently, even when the
Nature-dictated state of the world is favourable for
the aspirant disruptor to flourish, failure to realize
its potential due to ill coordination lurks all around.
Factoring the limitations and (rather drastic) simpli-
fications of our model in, it emerges from this obser-
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vation that a possible strategy for the potential
disruptor is to shrewdly manoeuvre to ensure the
existence of a unique equilibrium in the first round—
by investing, at the very beginning, in communi-
cating precise information—so that if the under-
lying economic fundamentals are propitious, success
is achieved in the first round. n
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A. St2 is (strictly) decreasing in θ
Proof. We have, ∀θ ∈ R,
St2(θ) = St1(θ)
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Given that Φ : R →]0, 1[, and exp : R → R∗+, we
have
dSt2(θ)
d θ
< 0.
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